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1. SUMMARY: This is the Dayton school desegregation 
case. It has three times been up to the Sixth Circuit Court 
of App eals and this Court has once denied certiorari (423 U.S. 
1000, No. 75-403). In its first opinion (February 7, 1973), 
the DC (Rubin) (S.D. Ohio) found limited constitutional vio--lations; he twice ordered limited remedies; after the second 
CA 6 remand, Judge Rubin ordered the transporta tion of some 
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15,000 students in order to desegregate the entire Dayton ----school system. (The system is encompassed by one school 
district.) The Board seeks cert from CA 6's affirmance of 
the last DC order. 
2. FACTS: Brinkman I 
The DC's first opinion contains the factual 
findings that establish the constitutional violation. Since 
\ the 1880's, Ohio law has mandated an integrated school system, 
\ but there have been "isolated but repeated instances" of the 
Dayton Board's failure to meet the standards of Ohio law. The 
most serious of these violations took place in the pre-Brown 
l/ 
era and were corrected before Brown or shortly thereafter. -
There was no evidence that the Board manipulated boundaries of 
attendance zones or bused students so as either to foster one-
race schools or to encourage a racial mix within the schools. 
The Board's construction policy was not shown to be "segrega;tive . 
in nature other than to provide schools in white neighborhoods 
"':./ 
- These include pre-Brown practices of (1) se~arating pupils 
and teachers by race in one school in the 1920 s; (2) denial to 
blacks of access to swimming pools in the '30's and '40's; 
(3) exclusion, from 1938-48, of black high school teams from the 
city athletic conference; (4) the hiring of few black teachers 
before 1930 and hiring blacks who taught only in black schools up 
to the early 1950's; and (5) the creation of Dunbar High as a 
black high school in 1933. Nos. (1), (2), and (3) ceased before 
Brown; hiring ~olicies changed in the 1951-52 school year and by 
the early 1970 s (after an agreement with HEW) the percentage of 
black teachers in each school roughly reflected the percentage of 
black students in the entire system. When Dunbar was created no 
attendance zones existed in Dayton; when attendance zones were 
established in the post-war period, Dunbar continued as a city-
wide all-black high school until it closed in 1962. 
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which remain predominantly white and schools in black 
neighborhoods which remain predominantly black," pursuant 
to a policy of building schools where the children are. 
Id., at 7a. The majority of optional attendance zones 
(overlapping attendance areas permitting a choice between 
two or more schools) had no racial significance at the time 
of their creation; at least three of four remaining high 
school optional attendance zones (including the two largest), 
however, did have "adverse racial effects." Since 1969, 
Dayton has had a free enrollment policy, which allows students --
to enroll in any school that has room. Students within the 
attendance area of the school have first priority, students 
meeting the requirements for special programs in the school 
have second, and students whose transfer will contribute to 
improved racial balance have third priority. There was no 
-evidence that black students were denied enrollment in any , . 
however, has contributed little to racial balance in the schools. 
"The great majority of all schools in the Dayton system today 
have student populations which are racially imbalanced, con-
sistent with the black-white population and geographical dis-
tribution thereof"; until 1971 no effort was made by the Board 
\~1\ to achieve racial balance in the schools. Petn. App., at Sa. 
~~n 1971, ;;-:even-member Board adopted several resolutions 
recognizing the existence of racial segregation in the schools, 





and the need for affirmative action to eliminate the patterns. 
These resolutions were rescinded after two newly elected mem-
bers took their seats on the Board in the beginning of 1972. 
From these findings the DC isolated "racially imbalanced 
schools, optional attendance zones, and recent Board action [as] 
cUIIII}{ulatively in violation of the Equal Protection Clause" and 
therefore justifying court intervention under Brown. Id., at 
12a. As a remedy the court ordered the abolition of optional 
attendance zones, non-racially based faculty assignment and 
employee hiring policies, new priorities for the free enrollment 
system (first priority to students currently attending a school, 
all other places assigned randomly to students seeking admis-
sion); and specialized integrated programs on a city-wide basis. 
CA 6 accepted the DC's finding of a three-part 
'- - ~~-------------------------constitutional violation but held that the remedy was inadequte 
to eliminate all vestiges of state-imposed segregation. 
Brinkman II. On remand, the DC clarified its .factual 
findings and firmly stated that Ohio has not in this century 
; 
required a dual system o~ education, and that the Dayton Board 
has at no time maintained a dual system~he Board did en;age 
~ ~ ---- :w.------.......,....-.,e:wza~ ...... """t ~ .. , -
in activities which were segregative in effect. Relying in part 
on the Equal Educational Opportunities Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1701, et 
~·:which endorsed the concept of neighborhood schools and 
limited remedies to correction of particular violations, the DC 
rejected an integration plan to match the percentage of black 
white students in each school to the percentage of each race 
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in the entire system. Instead, it ordered the closing of 
one of the all-black schools (with the students to enroll 
in another school of their choice); the development of 
magnet schools (some of which would be part-time); the 
establishment of racially balanced, mandatory elementary 
school science centers; and the perpetuation of the open 
enrollment program. This plan was to be tried for the 
1975-76 school year and, if ineffective, to be replaced in 
September of 1976. 
CA 6 again disapproved the remedy and remanded for 
modification of the plan "so as to improve the. racial balance 
• • • in as many of the remaining racially identifiable schools 
in the Dayton system as feasible." The DC was further instructed 
to develop a system-wide plan for the 1976-77 school year. CA 6 
clarified its prior holding to mean that the Dayton system "has 
been and is guilty of de jure segregation practices." 
Brinkman III. On remand, the DC ordered that "as of 
September 1, 1976, each and every school in the Dayton School 
District will have a pupil population approaching the distr ict 
percentage [48% black, 52% white], but deviating no more than 
15% plus or minus." The only exception was that students then in ---grades 10, 11, 12 were to be permitted to graduate from their 
current schools. The court also allowed that variations from 
the specified percentages "by reason of geographic location" 
would be considered on an individual basis. CA 6 affirmed. 
( 
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3. CONTENTIONS: Petr contends that the broad 
relief is inconsistent with Swann, Keyes, Milliken, and 
the EEOA, in that it exceeds the scope of the violations 
and it establishes fixed percentages of racial balance. 
Petr also contends that the individual plaintiffs in this 
action have not shown any constitutional injury to them-
selves or that they were members of the class that they 
claim to represent. Resps contend that the remedy is 
necessary to eliminate the effects of de jure segregation, 
that the percentages are merely guidelines and consistent 
with Swann, et al., and that petr's standing contentions were 
rejected by CA 6 on the first appeal and until now have not 
been again presented to any court. 
4. DISCUSSION: The only colorable claim is the 
consistency of the remedy finally approved by CA 6 with this 
Court's prior cases. Resps seem correct in their assertio~ that 
it is a bit late to question standing; and the EEOA claim washes 
out if the remedy is tailored to the constitutional violation, 
since that Act does not purport to limit the courcs' powers to 
remedy deprivations of constitutional rights. 
Although the DC did appear to be establishing fixed 
ratios for each school, the 15% variance and the opportunity for 
further variation where necessary seems to bring the DC's action 
within Swann's permission to use ratios as "a starting point in 
the process of shaping a remedy, rather than an inflexible re-
quirement." 402 U.S., at 25. It is close, but I don't think the 
issue is by itself cert"tvorthy. J ~ . 
,.. .. 
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The question of the need for such a broad remedy is 
more problematic. Unlike Swann, which dealt with a dual 
system, the DC here expressly found that neither the State 
nor the Dayton Board had maintained a dual school system. 
To be sure, there were limited de jure segregative practices, 
but I can find nothing in the DC or appellate opinions sug-
gesting that the practices produced the present state of racial 
imbalance in the Dayton schools. On the contrary, the DC found 
the racial imbalance to be "consistent with the black-white 
population and the geographical distribution thereof." Un-
fortunately, the DC made no finding as to what effect the 
2/ 
segregative practices had. There seems to be no factual basis 
for determining whether, as in Keyes, "school authorities have 
carried out a systematic program of segregation affecting a 
substantial portion of the students, schools, teachers, and 
facilities." 413 U.S., at 201. Moreover, Keyes relied on tpe 
"systematic program" as a predicate for finding the existence of 
a dual school system, id., but here no matter what the segregative 
II 
After the first remand, and at the same time that it 
established that no dual system existed, the DC cryptically 
found: 
"Overt evidences of • • • 
segregative activities have 
been eliminated both by action 
of the Board of Education and 
by previous Order of this Court 
but the effect thereof may not. 11 
Petn. App., at 75a. 
.~ 
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practices, the DC expressly found that no dual system had 
ever existed. Contrary to resps' assertion, Resp., at 15 
n. 12, citing CA 6 Opinion in Petn. App., at 89a-90a, CA 6 
-.. 
that Dayton has suffered under a dual school 
system. -
It may well be, as CA 6 held, that the first two 
remedies ordered by the DC were inadequate to eliminate the 
vestiges of whatever constitutional violations had taken place. 
It does not follow, however, that a "full integration" remedy 
was necessarily required. The correct course would seem to be 
for the DC to determine the effects of the unconstitutional 
segregative practices and to shape a remedy that would eliminate 
those effectso 
3/ 
CA 6 has, however, suggested, but not yet held, that the DC 
should have found other constitutional violations. On the £;rst 
appeal the court reviewed the evidence ~rtaining to the aileged 
violations in staff assignment, school construction, grade 
structure and reorganization, and transfers and transportation. 
CA 6 concluded that: 
"[A]ppellants have raised 
serious questions with resvect to 
whether the District Judge s failure 
to include these four school prac-
tices within the cumn1ulative violation 
was supported by substantial evidence. 
In view [of our remand on remedy], we 
conclude that it is unnecessary at 
this stage to ~ass on whether the 
District Judge s findings of fact with 
respect to these four school practices 
is supported by substantial evidence." 
Petn. App., at 66a-67a. 
Although resps seek support from CA 6's review of other possibly 
segregative practices (Resp., at 3 & n. 2; 5 n . . 3; 13 n. 10), they 
do not now challenge the refusal of both courts to hold that these 
practices amounted to constitutional violations. 
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This case presents a poor factual record for any 
significant desegregation decision. CA 6's insistence on 
a system-wide remedy in conjunction with the DC's silence 
on the effect of the violations has left a gap of un-
determinable size between the injury and the remedy. Assuming 
that such a gap is impermissible, whether as a matter of con-
stitutional law or equitable remedies, see Milliken, 418 U.S., 
at 753 (concurring opinion of JUSTICE STEWART), the judgment 
should be vacated and the case remanded for a factual deter-
mination of the effects of the constitutional violations and 
the ordering of a remedy that will successfully eliminate those 
effectso 
It should be noted that the DC's final remedy was to 
be implemented for the 1976-77 school year. The Court of 
Appeals (August 16, 1976) and Justice Stewart as Circuit Justice 
(August 19, 1976) denied the Board's motions to stay the jyqg-. 
ment pending the petition for certiorari. Thus, according to 
resps, "the desegregation plan has been implemented as required." 
Resp.,atl2. 
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To: Justice Powell Date: 12/8/76 
From: Tyler Baker 
Re: Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, No. 76-539 
This memo is intended as a supplement to the cert pool memo 
which is a careful and accurate descriptionHX of the papers. 
1) The original DC opinion. Petn, App., at la. The DC found that 
there was nothing irrational or manipulative about the way that the 
attendance zones had been drawn. Similarly, the court found that the 
Wt.r~ 
site selections for the construction of new schools A._ based on 
neutral factors. In applying the law to the facts, the court noted 
that the situation at issue was simply KKIK unlike that in XM«RKKX 
southern schools. 
Petn, App., at 26a. 
2) DC Supplemental Order of Remedy.AThe DC quite enthusiastically 
endorsed the views that you expressed in your concurrence and dissent 
in Keyes. The court noted that some transportation in furtherance of 
integration would occur under the Freedom of Enrollment plan with the 
new priorities favoring transfers that ~I would further integration. 
The DC also recognized that the KHXM Board had not done as much 
affirmatively with its attendance and construction MXX~XKK decisions 
as it might have done. The DC held that the XMM affirmative obligation 
that you described would have prospective effect. 
3) The first CA opinion. Petn, App., at 32a. TheCA affirmed the 
findings of constitutional violations of the DC. It reviewed the 
claims of the app'ants regarding other alleged violations, but without 
finding that the DC had erred in not finding them to be violations. 
The CA appeared simply to defer KXX judgment about those claims because 
(I think) ~ its remedy order would cover the alleged violations in 
any event. "In view of our holding in Section V hereof ["Remedy"], 
we concludeMXX that it is unnecessary at this stage to pass on whether 
I 
the District Judge's findings of fact with respect to these four 
( St~J 
school lfliX practices isAsupported by substantial evidence." Petn, 
App., at 67a. Without much MIMXH~ elaboration, theCA held that 
the remedy ordered by the DC was inadequate. 
4) Order of DC. Petn, App., at 70a. The DC stated that it 
viewed the transportation of students "only as a last resort and only 
after careful inquiry has established that no other solution exists." 
XX~ Petn, App. at 72a. 
5) Order of DC. Petn, App. at XXX 73a. In this order, the DC 
sets out its view of the proper approach to a case of this kind. The 
language MIX about equity and tying the remedy to the scope of the 
violation sounds as though it was lifted out of our Austin concurrence. 
The EM~ court XKX also stressed the fact that the XMXK Board was 
operating in good faith and deserved the chance for its suggestions 
to be given a chance. 
6) Second CA opinion. Petn, App., at 89a. This is the opinion 
that forced the DC to order the sweeping plan now before this Court. 
The CA noted that the plan approved by the DC did nothing to chang~ the 
basic pattern of "one:IDC race" schools. Petn, App., at 93a. The :M:M~ 
CA ordered the DC to order system-wide remedies. Id. at 96a. 
7) Order of DC. Petn, App., at 99a. This is the order that 
adopts the plan described in the cert pool ~ memo. 
8) Third and final ~tKI~ CA opinion. Petn, App. at 118a. 
The CA argues that the 15% variance built into the plan in addition to 
the "safety valve" exception for exceptional circumstances shows that 
the ratios here were no more than a starting point. The CA notes, to 
&~o~ 
what effect IXX I am not sure, that the XMRXKXK~ Board did notAthat 
there were anyKX special problems of geography, etc., with cross-district 
M«KKI~ busing. It is important to note that the guid~lines adopted 
. --
by the DC are much more sensitive to the values that you have MMXX 
mentionedA See Petn, App., at 119a-120a. XXX Finally, I was surprised 
to find that your old friend Dr. Finger was the special master here~ 
Id. at 120a. 
Discuss ion: 
The fact that the DC did not make any particular findings M~XX 
about the effect of the discrimination that it found makes the case 
less than ideal, KX because there is no base line of comparision. 
At the same time, it is clear that the DC thought that it ~ setting 
the remedy equal to the scope of the violations. The CA certainly did 
,.. ,_.;wa:rn~ -~ not attempt to tie its desire for a more comprehensive remedy to 
any view of the extent of the violations. In fact, theCA's statement -that, in view of its approach to the remedy, it didMX not need to addresss 
the question of the other alleged violations shows rather XX~ starkly that 
it was not IXMXXKH limiting the remedy to the scope of the violations 
-----------~------~-----------'----~------_... ________ ,_~--------------------------------,--
I XMIK think that one might have concluaed that the Board was less 
than neutral in its choice of construction KX sites for new schoo~s ~ 
The statistics here are quite strong. If such a finding had been MXKHM 
made, I think that one could have XX justified some XXM«X~KRX transporta-
tion designed to achieve the mix that would have occurred had the 
XKKMXI schools been built in places that would have furthered integration. 
.. 
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To: Justice Powell Date: 1/11/76 
From: Tyler Baker 
Re: School Cases: 76-539 and 76-458 
My view is that the Dayton case is best for your purposes. 
It is not perfect, for the reasons stated in my supplementary 
memo, but it does provide a forum to consider the proper remedial 
standards. The IndianQpolis case is so ful~f issues that a clear 
exposition of remedial issues would be less likely. I think that 
it would be better held for the decision in Dayton and then remanded 
for consideration in light of that decision and Arlington Heights, 
as suggested by Gene. 
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MEMORANDUM 
Tyler Baker TOI 
FROM I Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Dayton Case 
DATE1 March 1, 1977 
The above case will probably be argued the second week 
in March or in April. 
Give some thought to the question whether we could be 
helped by the Library of Congress. As Charlie can tell you, 
we made a request to that Library for information relevant 
to Ingraham, and received a helpful memorandum. 
Dayton, in addition to involving the "scope of the remedy" 
issue, presents - I believe - the "racial balance" issue, 
namely, whether Swann either commands or justifies a court 
order that every school within a district must achieve a 
specified percentage (even within limits) of blacks and whites. 
In Pasadena, the Court held that at least it would be 
inappropriate to require specified racial balance except 
as a starting point for one year. 
There may be some scholarly research, or congressional 
committee reports relevant to these issues. 
Although I am not inclined to get into pedagogical debates, 
I would like to know whether there has been any empirical 
research as ~o the impact of extensive busing on educational 
' . -
quality, the cost of education, and - possibly - on public 
support for schools in terms of supporting tax increases, 
bond issues and the . like. 
2. 
I am inclined to think, subject to discussion with you, 
that it might be worthwhile to frame some questions, and 
submit them through our libra£rannto the Library of Congress. 
We may produce a "waterhaul" or even a mass of 
indigestible and unhelpful data. On the other hand, there 




To: Gene Corney Date: April 25, 1977 
From: L. F. P. , Jr. 
No. 76-539 Dayton 
The briefs by the parties seem to be talking 
about two entirely different cases. Resp's brief (I 
have some real doubts whether resps have article III 
standing) conveys the impression of massive, systemwide 
de jure segregation, practiced by the school board for 
some 90 years. The school board's brief concedes only 
a single "constitutional violation", and one widely 
believed at the time to be perfectly valid: the use 
of "optional attendance zones". 
The decision in this case (at least my vote) 
seems likely to turn upon the district court's (DC) 
findings of fact. It is here that I would appreciate 
your initial assistance. 
Using the school board's brief as a starting 
point, it conveys - in summary form - the following 
situation as to the only relevant findings in the long 
history of this case: 
The DC found for the school board with respect 
to each of the following critical "practices": 
"While school practices in the area of 
staff assignment, site selection, grade 
structure and organization, student 
transfers and transportation were alleged 
to have constituted the establishment 
of a dual system, these practices were 
passed upon by the District Judge and 
were found free from any se?regative 
intent or effect (A. 5-10)! Brief, p. 7. 
The DC found only three acts or practices deemed 
to constitute "a cumulative violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause": (i) that racially imbalanced schools 
existed; (ii) an optional attendance plan; (iii) recision 
by the school board of resolutions (adopted by a prior 
"lame duck" board) calling for racial balance in the 
entire school system. 
2. 
The school board's brief- at least on the surface -
rather persuasively disposes of two of these three adverse 
findings: 
(i) Racially Imbalanced Schools. This is said 
to have resulted solely from "geographic distribution of 
the races' (a demographic rather than a de jure consequence). ~ 
Indeed, the DC apparently found as a fact: 
"At no time . • . did defendant maintain 
a dual system of education (A. 75)." 
Washington v. Davis is cited here for the pro-
position that proof of racially discriminatory intent or 
purpose - not mere proof of racial imbalance - is required. 
Arlington Heights also is cited. Brief 20. 





school board argues that a lame duck board, defeated in 
the November, 1971, election, passed three resolutions 
designed to eliminate all attendance zones, require large 
scale transportation of students, and establish racial 
balance in "each school in the Dayton system". (Gene: we 
should take a look to see whether this is a fair description 
of the resolution.) 
In any event, the school board says that the 
Circuit Court did not identify the recision as "an 
independent constitutional violation"; rather, CA 6 simply 
held that "the recision was part of the cumulative violation 
since recision alone could not constitute a violation of 
the constitution unless there was a duty to take the 
action that was recinded." 503 F.2d 684, 697. 
(iii) Optional Attendance Zones. The school 
board states that the finding of constitutional violation 
here "is the keystone of the cumulative violations which 
the court found to exist". It is said that without this 
finding, neither the demographic racial imbalance nor 
recision of the resolution would have constitutional 
significance. 
Optional attendance zones were created from time 
to time in the '50s and '60s. They permitted a student 
residing in a designated zone to attend one of two 
schools at his option. The board states that "standards 
of access, safety, school capacity, convenience and prior 
patterns of attendance were the criteria governing the 
establishment of the optional zones." Brief at 22. 
4. 
The board states (and I know this to be a fact) 
that optional zones - often called "freedom of choice" 
plans - were widely used in most of the big city school 
systems during the period in question. No zone in Dayton 
ever excluded anyone from attending any school in the 
Dayton system; such a zone provided a choice between two 
schools for students living within the boundaries. Brief 
at 22. 
The school board states that the DC specifically 
found that "the majority of the optional zones had no 
racial significance at the time of their creation". (A. 8; 
Brief 22). But the DC apparently held that four zones 
"may have constituted exceptions to the general rule", 
and thattwo of the zones "have had the most demonstrable 
racial effects". The brief then argues that none of 
the four suspect zones possibly could have contributed 
significantly to either the creation or perpetuation 
of desegregation. 
Thus, the "bottom line" of the board's argument 
' J 
is - as you know - that the racial balance remedy ordered 
in this case vastly exceeded the relatively minor 
violations. 
If the school board's perception of the scope 
and import of the DC's finding of fact is substantially 
correct, the holding of CA 6 is suspect. The briefs 
of respondent and the SG challenge sharply the school 
boards views • 
I would appreciate your going directly tothe 
factual source: the findings of the DC, which - if any -
were found by CA 6 to be erroneous, and what inferences 
fairly may be drawn from these findings. 
5. 
TO: MR . JUSr 'G.: POWELL 
ee l / / 4 / 27/ 77 
FROM: Gene Corney 
RE: No. 76-539, Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman 
BOBTAIL BENCH MEMO 
In your memo to me of 4/25/77 you indicated that the parties 
seem to be talking about two entirely different cases. That is 
an accurate observation, though I hope in this memo to explain how 
it is that the parties have come to differ on the extent of 
discrimination . I will begin by setting out for you in summary 
form the findings of the various courts below. 
,r,r,r THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
(1) The factual finding with respect to a "cumulative consti-
tutional violation. 
The District Court found a cumulative constitutional 
violation composed of three elements: (a) substantial racial 
imbalance in student enrollment patterns throughout the school 
system; (b) the use of four "optional attendance zones" intended to 
allow some white students to avoid attending predominantly black 
schools; and (c) the School Board's rescission in 1972 of the 
resolutions passed in late 1971 by its lameduck predecessors--the 
resolution had acknowledged the Board's responsibility for the 
existing racial separation . 
(2) The factual finding of an "independent" constitutional 
violation. 
The DC found that the 1972 resc ission of the resolutions 
constituted an independent constitutional violation. 
(3) 
The DC entered several findings of fact adverse to the 
--- ;,a pt?7M'--~ - ' 
plaintiffs! (a) ;rhere was no evidence that attendance zones had ., 
been designed or altered for reasons motivated by racial considerations; 
(b) when a middle school program was established in 1971 the 
established attendance boundaries had neither segregative nor 
integrative effect; (c) with respect to elementary school construction 
and site selection, sufficient evidence had not been presented to 
show that it was segregative in nature; (d) with respect to high 
school construction and site selection, no evidence had been presented 
that the Board failed to use neutral criteria in its choices. 
(e) Dayton adopted in 1969 and modified in 1972 a "freedom of en-
rollment" plan, and the DC found that the plan had been conceived 
and operated without discriminatory intent or a racially disproportionate 
effect. 
./.7'1 
(4) The factual finding~s with respect to historical perspective. 
The DC made its factual findings against what it called 
a "historical perspective" of intentional discrimination. This - ~ 
included physical separation into separate buildings of teachers 
and pupils by race prior to Brown. There were. also pre-Brown 
restrictions on the access of blacks to athletic facilities and 
~­
!~ 
the city athletic conference. The physical isolation of students by 
...J • 
race ended prior to Brown • ....___..__.._ ....__...._ 
The Board was found to have followed a practice of racially 
discriminatory faculty assignment until 1952. Under this plan __________ ......_ _________ ,~-------- -
black teachers were to teach only black students. This was gradually 
eliminated, and by 1969 each school had at least one black teacher. 
In 1971 the Board reached an agreement with HEW providing for 
faculty desegregation. 
j~ Dunbar high school had been intentionally established in 1933 
~ ( as an all-black high school. It continued to exist as a city-wide 
all-black high school until it closed in 1962. 
***A NOTE ON THE DISTRICT COURT"S FACTUAL FINDINGS*** 
I have concluded, after reading all of the opinions in this 
case, that the District Court probably misconceived its role. At 
one point, the DC states that "both by reason of the time that has 
elapsed and because these [intentionally segregative] practices have 
ceased, however, the [prior intentional discrimination] will not 
necessarily be deemed to be evidence of a continuing segregative 
policy." In my view, that is the wrong inquiry. The mere fact 
that a school board has engaged in intentionally discriminatory 
actions in the past does not necessarily mean that it is currently 
+ 
engaging in segregative policies. But if also does not 
~ necessarily mean that the passage of time eliminates the basis for 
relief to the plaintiff class. Even if there are no current 
segregative actions, the DC's role is to determine the "vestiges" 
of state-imposed segregation, and to develop a remedy in light of the 
violation. The DC in this case at no point proceeded to determine 
the extent of the "vestiges" of prior discr-imination. 
One could argue that it is clear that the DC thought it was 
setting the remedy equal in scope to the constitutional 
violations, and thus it must have concluded initially that the ---- - - __.. 
"vestiges" did not warrant a systemwide remedy since it did not 
initially order a systemwide remedy. But one would have to stretch 
to do that. It is clear that the DC thought its primary task was 
m locate present constitutional violations and to remedy them. 
For the reasons mentioned above, I think it unduly limited the 
scope of its inquiry, a fact which will hinder this Court's 
resolution of the issues. 
,f ,f ,f THE FIRST OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(1) The CA's view of the cumulative constitutional violation. 
CA6 found that the DC's factual findings on this score 
were not only not clearly erronesous, but that they were amply 
supported by the record evidence. 
(2) TheCA's view of the independent constitutional violation. 
CA6 expressly declined to reach this question given its 
affirmance of the factual findings with re~t to the cumulative 
violation. 
(3) TheCA's views of the DC's findings of fact with respect 
to the absence of constitutional violations in other Board 
pract~ces. 
CA6 sttted that the plaintiffs raised ~ least four ot~er 
areas in which constitutional violations might be found: (a) staff 
assignment; (b) school construction; (c) grade structure and 
reorganization; and (d) transfers and transportation. Although the OL 
found no constitutional violations in these ' areas, CA6 was of the 
~ ~ 
view that the plaintiffJ s on appeal to that court~raised serious 
we.'~'e. 
questions as to whether the DC's findings~ supported by the 
evidence. But CA6 found it unnecessary to pass on this issue since 
it had already affirmed the DC's finding of a cumulative violation. 
(4) The CA's view of the DC's findings on historical perspective. 
CA6 noted that the finding with respect to physical 
separation of pupils and teachers according to race was not challenged 
on appeal. 
***A NOTE ON THE CA'S VIEW OF THE EXTENT OF DISCRIMINATION 
As I read the CA6 initial opin~on in this case, I find 
implicit the view that there were serious systemwide "vestiges" 
~
of prior state-imposed segregative practices. See especially the 
following passage: 
Once the plaintiff-appellants have shown that state-
imposed segregation existed at the time of Brown (or 
any point thereafter), school authorities "automatically 
assume an affirmative duty . • • to eliminate from the 
public schools within their school system 'all vestiges 
of state-imposed school segregation.'" [citing Keyesj 
When such a showing has been made, "racially neutral" 
plans which fail to counteract the continuing effects of 
past school segregation are inadequate. . , 
,r,r,r QTHER RELEVANT STATEMENTS IN SUBSEQUENT OPINIONS OF THE DC AND CA 
(1) The second DC opinion in this case noted that the School 
Board "had elljCA.j~d. in activities which were segregative in effect 
and which did impinge upon the constitutional rights of students in 
such system. At no time, however, did [the Board] maintain a dual 
system of education." The DC also made the following statement: 
~· 
"Overt evidences of such segregative activities have been eliminated 
both by action of the Board of Education and by previous order of 
this g0urt but the effect thereof may not." The DC stated that 
these remarks were to be deemed findings of fact whether implicit 
or explicated by its previous opinions. 
DISCUSSION 
FIRST: The United States, as amicus curiae, takes the position 
that a court is not at liberty to produce a result--racial 
mixture in school attendance--merely because that result may be 
considered desirable. The remedy must operate on the violations 
and their continuing effects. As I read the brief of the United 
States, it is in agreement with the position you expressed in Austin 
that the extent of an equitiable remedy is determined by and may not 
properly exceed the effect of the constitutional violation. Busing 
I 
is permissible where the evidence supports a finding that 
the extent of integration sought to be achieved by busing would 
\ 
have existed had the school authorities fulfilled their constituiona~ 
obligations in the past. 
SECOND: The United States concludes, and I fully agree, that 
the three-part cumulative violation discussed above does not 
support the remedial order entered in this case. Racial imbalance 
is not itself a violation of the constitution. It is unlikely that 
the four optional attendance zones highlighted by the DC would have 
had a pervasive discriminatory impact. The rescission of the 
resolution is not a constitutional violation unless it constitutes 
a refusal by the Board to discharge a constitutional duty derived 
from a source other than the initial resolutions. 
THIRD: That leaves the question what to do with this case. 
The School Board would have us dismiss the case. The plaintiff-
respondents would have us affirm. The United States would have us 
affirm on the ground that other facts of record--i.e., other than 
those of the cumulative violation--establish that Dayton has for 
a long time operated one set of schools primarily for whites and 
another set primarily for blacks. The United States suggests that 
it is proper for a court rebuttably to presume that those discriminatory 
( practices achieved their full potential as a contributing factor 
to the present observed racial imbalance in student attendance 
patterns. At this point the burden should shift to the school 
board to show the extent to which racial imbalance would have 
eKisted in the absence of the discrimination. Since the school 
board did not overcome that presumption in this case, they have 
not established that relief less extensive than that required by 
the order in effect at this time would eliminate the effects of 
racial discrimination. 
My own view is that it is necessary to remand this case to 
CA6. So far this whole case has centered around a three-part 
cumulative violation that cannot support the remedy actually 
entered by the DC. On the other hand, it does appear that Dayton 
e~rud~d --admittedly in the past--in severe discriminatory actions. 
We are presently hampered by the 
I f~ ~ith ~spec_t to the widespread discrimination. This ----.....__ 
~7 
fact that we have no lower court -------------
extent of the effects of the earlier 
Court has already recognized that 
residential patterns and the operation of the schools. Whether 
the racial discrimination on the part of the School Board other than 
the three-part cumulative violation had an effect on residential 
patterns which has in turn further contributed to racial imbalance 
in these schools is a factual matter. It is tough and it is 
complex. And I can't see any reason for this Court to untangle the 
whole thing in the first instance. 
I would therefore dispose of the case as follows~ First, 
I would make it clear that there must be a relationship between the 
constitutional violation and the remedy, and that in this case we 
can say for sure that the three-part constitutional violation does 
e.v .·d~ 
not justify this remedy. Second, ~ has been presented indicating 
that the Board engaged in serious and widespread discrimination for 
a considerable period of time. It is necessary to sort out the 
continuing effects of this discriminatory history. So far no lower 
court has focused on this aspect of the case. The case is therefore 
remanded for consideration of those issues. 
Third, this leaves the question as to whether the DC's order 
should remain in effect pending this further consideration. Three ~ , 
factors prompt me to conclude that the order should remain in effect. 
First, Dayton had engaged in serious racial discrimination, and there 
are surely some continuing widespread effects. Second, the plan 
has already been put into operation, and it may be best not to upset 
the applecart until the final results are in. Third, there is a 
e ...... +-.-..ll~ 
good chance that CA6 will l conclude that this particular remedy is 
justified. As I noted earlier, it stressed that there were serious 
problems with the DC's findings of fact as to the absence of 
present discrimination in such areas as construction. It will 
be free on remand to re-examine those DC findings. And it will 
undoubtedly rely more explicitly on the present effects of prior 
school board discrimination. 
. ·' 
ec/// 4/28/'-
SUPPLEMENTAL BENCH MEMO IN THE DAYTON SCHOOL CASE 
The DC ordered the School Board to present a plan that 
would accomplish the following; 
.1(2) 
Abolish all optional attendance zones presently re-
maining within the Dayton school system; 
Restate the priorities for high school atl.endance 
in the freedom of enro1lment plan in order that no 
student of a minority race may be denied attend-
ance at any high school in the Dayton Public 
School System and so that transfers for purpose of 
improving racial balance take precedence over cur-
riculum transfers; 
f.-!aintain faculty assignment policies that will re-
flect in each school the approximate ratio of black 
to white faculty throughout the district. 
Establish hiring policies that will enable the clerical 
and maintenance personnel hired by the school 
board of Dayton to approximate the proportion of 
black-to-white ratio of the Dayton School District. 
The School Board submitted the following plan• 
I. Elimination of Optional Zones - eliminated optional ~ 
attendance zones for elementary and high school 
IV. 
students. 
Freedom of Enrollment Priorities - revised the sjy-
tem's Freedom of Enrollment program in accord-
ance with a specified set of priorities. 
Faculty Assignment Practices - provided that fac-
ulty assignments for each school in the system 
should reflect the ratio of white to black faculty in 
the entire system. 
Hiring Policies for Classified Personnel - provided 
that blacks would be hired for classified positions, 
e.g. clerical, custodial and food service staff, to 
reflect the proportion of the black-to-white pop-
ulation residing within the Dayton School Disll:iet. 
'~ ~ 3 ;, 
~~·A.. 
~~-,~~ 
V. Science Environmental Progr~m - proposed the 
establishment of a city-wide elementary science f}tJ. ~ 
program guided by a trained staff working at four 
centers. The program was to be mai1datory and 
children were to be bused to produce a racial mix 
that approximates the ratio between black and 
white students in the system as a whole. 
VI. Patterson-Slivers Vocational High School - com-
bined two existing vocational schools into a new 
unified cooperative school with a district-wide at-
tendance area. 
VII. The Musical Stereopticon - formed an elementary 
and high school band orchestra and chorus on an 
all-city basis. 
VIII. Integrated Athletics - required schools that have no 
minorities on their teams to schedule schools that 
do have minorities represented. Iligh school sched-
ules were to be administered by a central athletic 
office to insure that racial isolation did not exist. 
IX. Minority Language Program - required all class· 
room teachers and administrators at the elementary 
school level to participate in a series of in-service 
workshops on linguistic differences that exist in 
American English. 
X. Living Arts Center - created departments in art, 
creative writing, dance and drama to pennit stu-
dets, teachers, and parents to expand their knowl-
edge in these areas. 
XI. Control Centers - created rumor control centers, 
school guidance centers, and area learning centers 
to create a more secure c1imate for quality educa-
tion in the school system. 
The DC APPROVED Parts I, III, and IV. The DC expressed 
" 
its "disappointment" with the limited nature of Parts V through. XI 
(but of course these later Parts were not mandated by the initial 
court order). The DC DISAPPROVED Part II and directed the 






Any student eligible to attend a Dayton public high 
school may attend any high school within the Day-
ton Public School district, provided that students 
presently enrolled in high schools shall have first 
priority to complete their education therein. 
Each incoming ninth grade class and all vacancies 
in the tenth, eleventh and twelfth grade classes 
shaH be filed from those pupils seeking admission. 
Where there is insufficient capacity for all pupils 
seeking admission, a random selection plan shall be 
used. 
Only insufficient capacity shall be deemed reason 
to exclude any applying pupil. 
Transportation shall be the responsibility of the 
Board of Education for all students eligible and 
approved for transfer outside of the attendance 
area of such students' residences. 
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In view of the confusion at various stages in this case, 
evident from the opinions both of the Court of Appeals and 
the District Court, as to the applicable principles and 
appropriate relief, the case must be remanded to the District 
Court for the taking -of additional evidence and the making of 
more specific findings. 
If the only deficiency in the record before us was the 
failure of the Court of Appeals to pass on respondents' 
assignments of error respecting the initial rulings of the 
District Court, it would be appropriate to remand the case 
to that court, but we think it evident that supplementation 
of the record will be necessary. Apart from what has been 
said above with respect to the use of the ambiguous phrase 
"cumulative violation" by both courts, the disparity between 
the evidence of constitutional violations and the sweeping 
remedy finally decreed requires supplementation of the record 
and additional findings addressed specifically to the scope 
of the remedy. It is clear, in any event, that the presently 
mandated remedy requiring racial balance of every school 
within 15% is wholly without support in the record before 
us. 
. 






CHAM BERS OF 
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 
Dear Bill: 
.§u:vuuu <qltltrt af tltt ~nittb .§t&U.s 
~a:$fringtcn, 19. ~· 20gt.>.1~ 
May 26, 1977 
No. 76-539 Dayton 
Thank you for the opportunity to take a look at your 
draft opinion on May 23. I will be glad to join the opinion 
when it is circulated. Meanwhile, I understand that it is 
undergoing the usual editing, and I have indicated in pencil 
some suggested changes. In addition, I make the following 
observations: 
1. Although I agree that the performance of CA6 was 
eccentric (to say the least), I doubt the wisdom of coming 
down on it quite so hard. I would not, for example, elevate 
the conduct of CA6 to the importance of the substantive 
issue before us. See p. 2, 3. Perhaps you have in mind 
John's thought that we should give CA6 .an opportunity to 
clarify the findings, rather than require a remand to the 
District Court. But I believe you make a wholly convincing 
case for the necessity of more specific findings by the 
District Court. 
2. The draft is not entirely clear as to the sequence, , 
and result, of the various appeals. I suppose you have in 
mind adding, near the beginning of the opinion, a brief review 
of the history of this case, stating how it reached us and 
identifying specifically the issues before us. 
3. As you point out, the District Court made only three 
ultimate findings of constitutional violation: racially 
imbalanced schools, optional attendance zones, and rescission 
of the lame-duck school board resolution. These were then 
described as a "cumulative violation" of the Equal Protection 
Clause. While this phrase is ambiguous, I believe at least 
five of us at the Conference thought that only the "optional 
attendance zones" violation had legal significance. The 
- 2 -
mere existence of racially imbalanced schools proves nothing, 
as this is a condition that exists in every major city in 
the United States where there is a black or Chicano population. 
Nor, is the rescission of the board resolution in itself a 
violation - ' as CA6 recognized. Thus, on the present record, 
the only identifiable constitutional violation relates to the 
optional ·attendance zones for two or three high schools. 
Even as to these, there was full freedom of choice, and the 
zones may well have been created at a time when lower court 
decisions supported freedom of choice as a permissible remedy. 
It was not until Green (1968) that this Court clarified its 
position on this remedy. 
In any event, you may wish to consider a narrowing of 
the focus with the view to concluding that - on the present 
record and in view of the ambiguity - the only arguable viola-
tion is the creation and maintenance of optional zones. On 
the record before us, there appears to be no justification 
for any remedial action with respect to other schools in the 
system. Indeed, if the history of this case were not so 
confused and if one had greater confidence in exactly what 
the courts below have found and held, I would vote for a flat 
reversal, and direct the District Court to confine the remedy 
to the consequences of the high school zones. 
4. You make rather sparing use of the desegregation 
case authority. There are some views expressed in Swann that 
may be worth quoting, for example: 
"The task [in formulating appropriate remedies] 
is to correct, by a balancing of the individual and 
collective interests, the condition that offends the 
Constitution." p. 16. 
" ••• it is important to remember that judicial 
powers may be exercised only on the basis of a 
constitutional violation. Remedial judicial 
authority does not put judges automatically in 
the shoes of school authorities whose powers are 
plenary. Judicial authority enters only when local 
authority defaults." p. 16. 
"As with any equity case, the nature of the viola-
tion determines the scope of the remedy. In default 
- 3 -
by the school authorities of their obligation to 
proffer acceptable remedies, a district court has 
broad power to fashion a remedy that will assure 
a unitary school system." p. 16. 
" ••• it should be clear that the existence of 
some small number of one-race, or virtually one-
race schooli within a district is not in and of 
itself the mark of a system that still practices 
segregation by law." p. 26. 
One can, of course, find just about anything he wants 
in the rambling, "paste-pot" opinion in Swann. Also, it is 
necessary to remember that Swann was addressing the 
traditional segregated school system that prevailed widely 
in the South. In the case before us, the District Court 
expressly found - as I recall - that no such system had 
existed in Dayton for many years, if ever. Thus, the 
Swann language about a "unitary system" and the Green 
language about "root and branch" are inapposite. 
As the central issue in this case is the appropriateness 
of the remedy ordered by CA6, I would make quite clear - by 
reference to what we have said in prior cases - that the 
nature and scope of the remedy are determined and limited 
by the constitutional violations found to exist. Of course, 
by their nature, the remedial powers of a court of equity 
are broad, but they may not reach beyond the outer boundaries 
of the violation that invokes equitable relief. 
In addition to the language in Swann, this point was 
addressed in Milliken, and in Potter's opinion in Hills v. 
Gautreaux. Also, you may find some relevant langauge in 
the little opinion I wrote on the remand of the Austin School 
case~ You would know better than I whether Pasadena - which 
you cite - merits quotation. 
5. I have dictated a rider for your consideration, that 
might be the basis for some revision of pages 24 and 25 of 
the draft. You are summarizing there the reasons for the 
taking of additional evidence and the making of more specific 
findings by the District Court. I think there are more 
fundamental reasons than the mere ambiguity of the phrase 
"cumulative violation". As indicated above, in view of the 
almost negligible specific findings of constitutional violation, 
- 4 -
we are giving the respondents (the original plaintiffs) the 
benefit of doubt by allowing the record to be reopened for 
further evidence and additional findings. 
I am sending a copy of this memo to Potter, and will be 
happy to confer with either or both of you on this or any 
subsequent draft. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
lfp/ss 
cc: Mr. Justice Stewart 
C HAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
,ju.prtntt Qf01ttt qf tlrt ~tb ,jtaf:tg 
._asfri:nghm. ~. "f~ 2llgiJ!$ 
May 26, 1977 
Re: No. 76-539 - Dayton 
Dear Lewis: 
Herewith are my immediate reactions to your letter 
of May 26th respecting proposed changes in the draft 
opinion~ I called you a moment ago, but you were 
temporarily tied up, and since I still do not feel 
quite up to spending a full day in the office after 
Conference I had planned to leave early this afternoon. 
I am therefore sending you this in writing, with the 
thought that you, Potter, and I can get together for 
any sort of discussion that is needed at our mutual 
convenience tomorrow. If the occasion should arise, 
I will be home at any time after four o'clock today, 




As to paragraphs two and four of your letter, 
I will have no trouble at all in accommodating them. 
I had sent the draft to the printer a couple of days 
ago, after having received Potter's suggestions, in 
order to avoid the final backup, but will suggest 
proposed changes in accordance with these paragraphs 
which will go in a second draft. 
With respect to paragraph thre e, I agree entirely 
with its thrust, but thought that I had pretty well 
said just that in the present draft. If it were not 
for the respondent's contentions which were never 
considered by the Court of Appeals I, too, could vote 
for a flat reversal, and direct the District Court to 
confine the remedy to the consequences of the high 
school zones. 
With respect to paragraph five, I think the 
substance of your proposal is probably an improvement 
on mine, and would like to try my hand at some 
modifications of yours to use as a substitute for 
my present language on pages 24 and 25. 
~ ~i37i7}~ 
. ~~ 
JL-. w- r.t ~1-A  ~ 
~-~· 1f ~lstDRAFT ~X'"~ 
MA, ... f ~ 
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J.u ~ ~ Petitioners, the United States Court~ ~ 
A ~ ·,;'; v. of Appeals for the Sixth • 
~~ • Mark Brinkman et al. Circuit. I -/ ;:t !/). 
[June -, t977] ~ I r 
MR. JusTICE REHNQUtST delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This school desegregation action comes to us after five years 
and two round trips through the lower federal courts.1 Those 
1 This action was filed on April 17, 1972, by parents of black children 
attending school· opemtcd by the defendant Dayton Board of Education. 
After a.n expedited hearing bet.ween November 13 and December 1, 1972, 
the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, on February 1, 1973, 
rendered findings of fact and conclu ions of law directing the formulation 
of a desegregation plan. App., at 1. On July 13, 1973, that court 
approved, with certain modifications a plan propo1>'1?d by the School Board. 
On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, that court 
affirmed the findings of fa.ct but reversed and remanded as to the proposed 
remedia.l plan. Brinkman v. Gilligan, 503 F. 2d 684 (CA6 1974) . 
The District Court then ordered the submis ion of new plans by. the 
Board aJld by any other interested parties. App., at 70. On March 10, 
1975, it rejected a plan proposed by the plaintiffs, and, with some modifi~ 
cations approved the Board's plan as modified a.nd expanded in an effort to 
comply with the Court of Appeals mandate. App., at 73. On appeal, 
the Court of Appeals again reversed as to remedy and directed that 
the District Court "a.dopt a system-wide plan for the 1976-1977 school 
year .... " Brinkman v. Gilligan, 518 F. 2d 853 (CA6 1975). 
Upon this second remand, the District Court, on December 29, 1975, 
ordered formulation of the plan whose terms are developed in text. App., 
at !}9. On March 25, 1976, the details of the plan were approved by the 
District Court. App., at 110. In the decision now under review, the 
Court of Appeals affirmed. Brinkman v. Gilligan, 539 F. 2d 1084 (CA6 
1976). 
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protracted proceedings have been devoted to the formulation 
of a remedy for actions of the Dayton Board of Education 
found to be in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. In the decision now under review, 
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit finally approved a 
plan involving districtwide racial distribution requirements, 
after rejecting two previous less sweeping orders by the Dis-
trict Court. The plan required, beginning with the 1976-
1977 school year, that the racial distribution of each school 
in the district be brought within 15% of the 487'o-52o/o black-
white population ratio of Dayton.2 As finally formulated, the 
plan employed a variety of desegregation techniques, in-
cluding the "pairing" 3 of schools, the redefinition of attend-
ance zones, and a variety of centralized special programs and 
"magnet schools." We granted certiorari,- U.S.- (Jan. 
17, 1976), to consider the propriety of this court-ordered 
remedy in light of the constitutional violations which were 
found by the courts below. 
Whatever public notice this case has received as it wended 
2 The court said that it would deal on a case-by-ca~e basis with fajlures 
to bring individual schools into compliance with this requirement. It. also 
ordered that. students already enrolled in the tenth Rnd eleventh grades be 
allowed to finish in their present high schools, a.nd announced the following 
"guidelines" to be followed "whenever possible" in the case of elementary 
school students: 
"1. Students may attend neighborhood walk-in schools in those neigh-
borhoods where the schools already have the a.pproved ratio; 
"2. Students should be transported to the nearest available school; 
"3. No student should be transported for a period of time exceeding 
twenty (20) minutes, or two (2) miles, whichever is shorter." App., 
at 104. 
a "Pairing" is the designation of two or more schools with contrasting 
racial composition for an exchange program where a large proportion of 
the students in ea.ch school attend the paired school for some period. In 
the plan adopted by the District Court, it was the primary remedy used 
in the case of elementa.ry schools. 
•' 
'' 
I· • .. 
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its way from the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Ohio to this Court has been due to the fact that it 
represented an effort by minority plaintiffs to obtain relief 
from alleged unconstitutional scgre~ation of the Dayton public 
schools said to have resulted from actions by the respondent 
School Board. While we would by no means discount the 
importance of this aspect of the case, we think that the case 
is every bit as important for the issues it raises as to the 
proper allocation of functions between the District Courts 
and the courts of appeals within the federal judicial system. 
Indeed, the importance of the judicial administration as-
pects of the case arc heightened by the presence of the sub-
stantive issues on which it turns. The proper observance of 
the division of functions between the federal trial courts and 
the federal appellate courts, is important in every case. It 
is especially important in a. case such as this where the District 
Court for the Southern District of Ohio was not simply asked 
to render judgment in accordance with the law of Ohio in 
favor of one private party against another; it was asked by 
the plaintiffs, students in the public school system of a large 
city, to restructure the administration of that system. 
There is no doubt that federal courts have authority to grant 
appropriate relief of this sort when constitutional violations 
on the part of school officials are proven. Keyes v. School 
District No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 413 U. S. 189 ( 1973); Swann 
v.Charlotte Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1 
(1971); Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U. S. 451 
( 1973). But our cases have just as firmly recognized that 
local autonomy of school districts is a vital national tradition. 
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U. S. 717, 741-742 (1974); San An-
tonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. I, 50 ( 1973); 
Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, supra, at 469 (1972). 
It is for this reason that the case for displacement of the local 
authorities by a. federal court in a. school desegration case must 
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a reasoned statement of legal principles. Cf. Pasadena City 
Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424 (1976). 
The lawsuit was begun in April1972, and the District Court 
filed its original decision on February 7, 1973. The District 
Court first surveyed the past conduct of affairs by the Dayton 
School Board, and found "isolated but repeated instances of 
failure by the Dayton School Board to meet the standards of 
the Ohio law mandating an integrated school system." 4 It 
cited instances of physical segration in the schools during the 
early decades of this century,5 but concluded that "[b]oth by 
reason of the substantial time that had elapsed and because 
these practices have ceased, however, the foregoing will not 
necessarily be deemed to be evidence of a continuing segrega-
tive policy." 
The District Court also found that as recently as the 1950s, 
faculty hiring had not been on a racially neutral basis, but that 
"by 1963, under a policy designated as one of 'dynamic 
gradualism,' at least one black teacher had been assigned to 
all eleven high schools and to 35 of the 66 schools in the entire 
system." It further found that by 1969 each school in the 
Dayton system had an integrated teaching staff consisting 
of at least one black faculty member. The Court's conclu-
sion with respect to faculty hiring was that pursuant to a 1971 
agreement with the Department of HEW, "the teaching staff 
of the Dayton public schools became and still remains sub-
stantially integrated." 6 
4 The court pointed out that since 1888, Ohio law as const.rued by its 
Supreme Court has forbidden separate public schools for black and white 
children. See Ohio Rev. Code § 3313.48; Board of Education v. State, 
45 Ohio St. 555 ( 1888). 
5 "Such instances include a physical segregation into separate buildings 
of pupils and teachers by race at the Garfield School in the ea.r]y 1920's, 
a denial to blacks of access to swimming pools in the 1930's and 1940's 
and the exclusion, between 1938 and 1948, of black high school teams from 
the city athLetic conference." App., at 2-3 (footnote omitted). 
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The District Court noted that Dunbar High School had 
been established in 1933 as a black high school, taught by 
black teachers and attended by black pupils. At the time of 
its creation there were no attendance zones in Dayton and 
students were permitted liberal transfers, so that attendance 
at Dunbar was voluntary. The court found that Dunbar 
continued to exist as a citywide all-black high school until it 
closed in 1962. 
Turning to more recent operations of the Dayton public 
schools, the District Court found that the "great majority" 
of the 66 schools were imbalanced and that, with one excep-
tion,7 the Dayton School Board had made no affirmative 
effort to achieve racial balance within those schools. The 
court stated that there was no evidence of racial discrimina-
tion in the establishment or alteration of attendance bound-·. 
aries or in the site selection and construction of new schools . 
and school additions. It considered the use of optional at-
tendance zones 8 within the District, and concluded that in the . 
majority of cases the "optional zones had no racial significance . 
at the time of their creation." It made a somewhat ambigu- ~ 
ous finding as to the effect of some of the zones in the past,9 
a!1d concluded that although none of the elementary optional 
school attendance zones today "have any significant potential 
effects in terms of increased racial separation," the same can-
observed that blacks made up a proportion of the nontea.ching, nonad~ 
ministrative personnel equal to the proportion of black students in· the , 
District, though in certain occupations they were represented at a sub- . 
stantially lower rate. 
7 The court noted that a concerted effort had been made in the past 
f!:)W years to enroll more black students at the Patterson Co-op High 
School. 
8 An optional zone is an area between two attendance zones, the 
st,udent residents of which are free to choose which of the two schools 
they wish to attend. 
, 9 The District Court found that three high school optional zones "may 
have" had racial significance at the' time of their creation. 
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not be said of the high school optional zones. Two zones in 
particular, "those between Roosevelt and Colonel White and 
between Kiser and Colonel White, are by far the larg0st in 
the system and have had the most demonstrable racial effects 
in the past." 10 
The court found no evidence that the District's "freedom 
of enrollment" policy had "been unfairly operated or that 
black students [had] been denied transfers because of their 
race." Finally the court considered action by the Board on 
January 3, 1972, rescinding resolutions, passed by the pre-
vious Board, which had a.cknowledged a role played by the 
Board in the creation of segregative racial patterns and had 
called for various types of remedial measures. The District 
Court's ultimate conclusion was that the "racially imbalanced 
schools, optional attendance zones, and recent Board action ... 
are cumulatively a violation of the Equal Protection Clause." 
The District Court's use of the phrase "cumulative viola-
tion" is unfortunately not free from ambiguity. Treated most 
favorably to the respondents, it may be said to represent the 
District Court's opinion that there were three separate al-
though relatively isolated instances of unconstitutional action 
on the part of petitioners. Treated most favorably to the 
petitioners, however, they must be viewed in quite a different 
light. The finding that the pupil population in the various 
Dayton schools is not homogeneous, standing by itself, is not 
a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment in the absence of 
showing intentionally segregative actions on the part of the 
Board. Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 239 (1976). 
10 Tho following information about those zones is contained in an 
appendix to the Dist-rict Court opinion: 
High Schools Date of Creation 
Roosevelt/ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1951 
Colonel White extended. . 1958 
Kiser/ . .. . . . . .. .. .. .. .. . 1962 
Colonel White ......... . 
% black population 
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The District Court's finding as to the effect of the optional 
attendance zones for the three Dayton high schools, assuming 
that it was a violation under the standards of Washington v. 
Davis, supra, appears to be so only with respect to high 
school districting. Swann, supra, 15 ( 1971). The District 
Court's conclusion that the Board's recision of previously 
adopted school board resolutions was itself a constitutional 
violation is also of questionable validity. 
The Board had not acted to undo operative regulations af-
fecting the assignment of pupils or other aspects of tho man-
agement of school affairs, cf. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U. S. 
369 ( 1967) , but simply repudiated its earlier resolution stat-
ing that it recognized its own fault in not taking affirmative 
action at an earlier date. We agree entirely with tho Court 
of Appeals' treatment of this latter action of the Board, 
wherein that court said: 
"The question of whether a recision of previous Board 
action is in and of itself a violation of appellants' con-
stitutional rights is inextricably bound up with the ques-
tion of whether the Board was under a constitutional 
duty to take the action which it initially took. Cf. 
Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U. S. 385 (1960); Gomillion v. 
Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 (1960). If the Board was 
not under such a duty, then the recision of the 
initial action in and of itself cannot be a constitutional 
violation. If the Board was under such a duty, then 
the recision becomes a part of the cumulative violation, 
and it is not necessary to ascertain whether the recision 
ipso facto is an independent violation of the Constitu-
tion." 503 F. 2d 684-697. 
Judged most favorably to the petitioners, then, the District 
Court's findings of constitutional violations amounted to very 
little under our decided cases. Nor is light cast upon the 
District Court's findings by its repeated use of the phrase 
"cumulative violation." We ~ize, of course, that the task 
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of factfinding in a case such as this is a good deal more dif-
ficult than is typically the case in a more orthodox lawsuit. 
Findings as to the motivations of multimembered public 
bodies are of necessity difficult, cf. Village of Arlington 
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 45 
L. W. 4073 (Jan. 11, 1973), and the question of whether de-
mographic changes resulting in racial concentration occurred 
from purely neutral public actions or were instead fostered 
by actions which appeared neutral on their face but were in 
fact invidiously discriminatory is not an easy one to resolve. 
We think it accurate to say that the District Court's for-
mulation of a. remedy on the basis of the three part "cumula-
tive violation" was certainly not based on an unduly cautious 
understanding of its authority in such a situation. The 
remedy which it originally propounded in light of these find-
ings of fact included requirements that optional attendance 
zones be eliminated, and that faculty assignment practices and 
hiring policies with respect to classified personnel be tailored 
to achieve representative racial distribution in all schools.11 
The one portion of the remedial plan submitted by the 
School Board which the District Court refused to accept 
without change was that which dealt with so-called "freedom 
11 Tho District Court's first plan also contained the following provi10ions: 
"(V) Establishment of four city-wide elementary science center the 
·enrollment of which would approximate the existing black-white ratio of 
students in tho system; 
"(VI) Combination of two high schools into a unified cooperative school 
with district-wide attendanre areas; 
"(VII) Formation of clem0ntary and high school all-city bands, orches-
tras and choruses; 
"(VIII) Provisions for clwduling of int.egrated athletics; 
"(IX) Establishment of a minority language program for education of 
staff; 
"(X) Utilization of the Living Arts C0nter for inter-racial experiences 
in art, creative writing, dance and drama; 
"(XI) Creation of oenters for rumor control, school guidance and area 
learning." 
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of enrollment priorities." The court ordered that, as applied 
to high schools, new students at each school be chosen at 
random from those wishing to attend. 12 The Board was re-
quired to furnish transportation for all students who chose to 
attend a high school outside the attendance area of their 
residence. 
Both the plaintiffs and the defendant School Board ap-
pealed the order of the District Court to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. 503 F. 2d 684. That 
court considered at somewhat greater length than had the 
District Court both the historical instances of alleged racial 
discrimination by the Dayton School Board and the circum-
stances surrounding the adoption of the Board's resolutions 
and the subsequent recision of those resolutions. This con-
sideration was in a purely descriptive vein: no findings of fact 
made by the District Court were reversed as having been 
clearly erroneous, and the Court of Appeals engaged in no 
factfinding of its own based on evidence adduced before 
the District Court. The Court of Appeals then focused on 
the District Court's finding of a three-part "cumulative" con-
stitutional violation consisting of racially imbalanced schools, 
optional attendance zones, and the recision of the Board re-
solutions. It found these to be "amply supported by the 
evidence." 
Plaintiffs in the District Court, respondents here, had cross-
appealed from the order of the District Court, contending 
that the District Court had erred in failing to make further 
findings tending to t3how segregative actions on the part of 
the Dayton School Board, but the Court of Appeals found 
it unnecessary to pass on these contentions. The Court of 
Appea.ls also stated that it was unnecessary to "pass on the 
question of whether the recision [of the Board resolutions] by 
itself was a violation of "constitutional rights." It did discuss 
12 The court thi.1s eliminated a provision within the Board plan which 
gave first priority to students residing within the schools attendance zone. 
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at length what it described as "serious questions" as to whether 
Board conduct relating to staff assignment, school construc-
tion, grade structure and reorganization, and transfers and 
transportation, should have been included within the "cum-
ulative violation" found by the District Court. But it did 
no more than discuss these questions; it neither upset the 
factual findings of the District Court nor did it reverse the 
District Court's conclusions of law. 
Thus the Court of Appeals, over and above its historical dis-
cussion of the Dayton school situation, dealt and upheld only 
with the three-part "cumulative violation" found by the Dis-
trict Court. But it nonetheless reversed the District Court's 
approval of the school board plan as modified by the District 
Court, because the Court of Appeals concluded that "the 
remedy ordered ... is inadequate, considering the scope of 
the cumulative violations." While it did not discuss the 
specifics of any plan to be adopted on remand, it repeated the 
admonition that the court's duty is to eliminate "all vestiges 
of state-imposed school segregation." Keyes, supra, at 202; 
Swann, supra, at 15. 
Viewing the findings of the District Court as to the three-
part "cumulative violation" in the strongest light for the 
respondents, the Court of Appeals simply had no warrant in 
our cases for imposing the systemwide remedy which it ap-
parently did. There had been no showing that such a 
remedy was necessary to "eliminate all vestiges of the state-
imposed school segregation." It is clear from the findings of 
the District Court that Dayton is a racially mixed commu-
nity, and that many of its schools are no·t either predominantly 
white or predominantly black. This fact without more, of 
course, does not offend the Constitution. Spencer v. Kugler, 
404 U. S. 1027 ( 1972); Swann, supra, at 24. The Court of 
Appeals seems to have viewed the present structure of the 
Dayton school system as a sort of "fruit of the poisonous tree," 
since some of the racial imbalance that presently obtains may 
-
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have resulted in some part from the three instances of seg-
gregative action found by the District Court. But instead of 
attempting to factually measure as accurately as possible the 
effects resulting from such a cause, and then tailoring the 
remedy to correct these violations, the Court of Appeals 
treated the case as if all of the racial separation and isolation 
in Dayton had resulted from the "cumulative violation" 
found by the District Court. 
On appeal, the task of a Court of Appeals is defined with 
relative ciarity; it is confined by law and precedent, just as 
are th9se of the d!strict courts and of this Court. If it 
concludes that the findings of the District Court are clearly 
erroneous, it may reverse them under Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 
52 (b). If it decides that the District Court has misappre-
.hended the law, it may accept that court's findings of fact 
but reverse its judgment because of legal errors. Here, how-
ever, as we conceive the situation, the Court of Appeals did 
neither. It was vaguely dissatisfied with the limited character 
of the remedy which the District Court had afforded plaintiffs, 
and proceeded to institute a far more sweeping one of its 
.own, without in any way upsetting the District Court's find-
Ings of fact or reversing its conclusions of law. 
The Court of Appeals did not actually specify a remedy, but 
did, in increasingly strong language, require that any plan 
eliminate system-wide patterns of one-race schools predom-
inant in the district. 518 F. 2d 853, 855. In the face of this 
commandment, the .District Court, after twice being reversed, 
observed. 
"This court now reaches the reluctant conclusion that 
there exists no feasible method of complying with the 
mandate of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit without the transportation of a substantial 
number of students in the Dayton school system. Based 
upon the plans of both the plaintiff and defendant the 
assumption must be that the transportation of approxi-
. ' 
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mately 15,000 students on a regular and permanent basis 
will be required." 
We think that the District Court would have been insensitive 
indeed to the nuances of the repeated reversals of its orders 
by the Court of Appeals had it not reached this conclusion. 
In effect, the Court of Appeals imposed a remedy which we 
think is entirely out of proportion to the constitutional viola-
tions found by the District Court, taking those findings of 
violations in the light most favorable to respondents. 
This is not to say that the last word has been spoken as to 
the correctness of the District Court's findings as to uncon-
stitutionally segregated actions on the part of the petitioners. 
As we have noted, ;;"pondents appealed from the initial de-
cision and order of the District Court, asserting that addi-
tional violations should have been found by that court. The 
Court of Appeals found it unnecessary to pass upon the re-
spondents' contentions in its first decision, and respondents 
have not cross-petitioned for certiorari from decision of the 
Court of Appeals in this Court. Nonetheless, they are en-
titled under our precedents to urge any grounds which would 
lend support to the judgment below, and we think that their 
contentions of unconstitutionally segrega.tive actions, in ad-
dition to those found as fact by the District Court, fall into 
this category. In view of the confusion at various stages in 
this case, evident from the opinions both of the Court of 
Appeals and the District Court, as to the applicable principles 
and appropriate relief, the case must be remanded to the 
District Court for the taking of additional evidence and the ) 
making of more specific findings. 
If the only deficiency in the record before us was the failure 
of the Court of Appeals to pass on respondents' assignments 
of error respecting the initial rulings of the District Court, 
it would be appropriate to remand the case to that court. 
But we think it evident that supplementation of the record 
will be necegy ;;~~part from what has been said above with 
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respect to the use of the ambiguous phrase "cumulative viola-
tion" by both courts, th~~rity between th~ evidence of 
CO£§ti1(_utional violations and the sweeping remedy finally 
decreed requires supplementation of the record and additional 
findings addressed specifically to the scope of the remedy. It 
is clear, in any event, that the presently mandated remedy 
cannot stand upon .the b~s of the violations found by the 
District Court ,- ~ -
The District d5urt, in the first instance, subject to review-
by the Court of Appeals, must mal<:e new findings and con-
clusions as to violations in the light of this opinion, W asking-
ton v. Davis, supra, and Village of Arlington Heights, supra. 
It must then fashion a remedy in the light of the rule laid 
down in Swann, supra, and elaborated upon in Hills v. 
Gautreaux, 425 U. S. 284 (1976). The power of the federa __ .., 
courts to restructure the operation of local and state govern-
mental entities "is not plenary. It 'may be exercised only on 
the basis of a constitutional violation.' r Milliken V. Bradley]' 
418 U. S., at 738, quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 16. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 
U. S. 362, 377. Once a constitutional violation is found, a 
federal court is required to tailor 'the scope of the remedy' to 
fit 'the nature of the violation.' 418 U. S., at 744; Swann, 
supra, at 16." Hills, supra, at 294. 
The duty of both the District Court and of the Court of 
Appeals in a case such as this, where mandatory segregation 
by law of the races in the schools has long since ceased, is to 
first determine whether there was any action in the conduct 
of the business of the school board which was intended to, 
and did in fact, discriminate against minority pupils, teachers 
or staff. Washington v. Davis, supra. All parties should be 
free to introduce such additional testimony and yther evidence A 
as the District Court may deem appropriate/ If such viola- V 
tions are found, the District Court in the first instance, sub-
ject to review by the Court of Appeals, must determine how 
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much incremental segregative effect these violations had on 
the makeup of the Dayton school population as presently 
constituted, when that population is compared to what it 
would have been in the absence of such constitutional viola-
tions. The remedy must be designed to redress that dif-
ference, and only if there has been a systemwide impact may / ~ 
there be a systemwide remedy. Keyes, supra, at 213. Y Z--
We realize that this is a difficult task, and that it is much 
easier for a reviewing court to fault ambiguous phrases such 
as "cumulative violation" than it is for the finder of fact to 
make the complex factual determinations in the first instance. 
Nonetheless, that is what the Constitution and what our cases 
call for, and that is what must be done in this case. 
While we have found that the plan implicitly, if not ex-
plicitly, imposed by the Court of Appeals was erroneous on 
the present state of the record, it is undisputed tha,t it has been 
in effect in the Dayton school system during the present year 
without creating serious problems. While a school board and 
a school constituency which attempt to comply with a plan 
to the best of their ability should not be penalized, we think 
that the plan finally adopted by the District Court should 
remain in effect for the coming school year subject to such 
further orders of the District Court as it may find warranted 
following the hearings mandated by this opinion. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the 
cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opmwn. 
It is so ordered. : . ."' 
' ... 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
.:iu:prtntt Qf4tttri llf tlft 'Jhlttb .:itatts 
-asfringhttt. ~. <!f. 2llp'!~ 
May 31, 1977 
Re: No. 76-539 Dayton Board of ' Education v. Brinkman 
Dear Lewis: 
Herewith is a more up to date reaction on my part to 
your memo of May 26. I have actively had a chance to 
incorporate several of your suggestions, and I attach a 
printed draft reflecting them which will be circulated 
later today. 
In response to your paragraph 2, I have added footnote 
1 setting forth the procedural history of the case. 
I agree completely with the thrust of your paragraph 
3, but upon reflection still think that the point is ade-
quately made by the language beginning on the bottom of 
p.6 and carrying over to p.7. Please let me know if you 
have something different in mind. 
I also agree, as suggested in paragraph 4, that the 
draft was a bit sparse on quotation from the governing cases. 
I have attempted to remedy that with a quote from Gautreaux 
(in which the full Court joined) which incorporates dis-
positive language from Milliken and Swann. See p.l3. 
Finally I think your rider proposed in paragraph 5 is 
an improvement over my language, and I have incorporated 
it verbatim with the exception of the last sentence which 
is modified as per Potter's suggested change in the previous 
draft. See pp. 12-13. 
Sincerely,~ 
Mr. Justice Powell 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WM.J . BRENNAN, JR. 
~ltptclnt QI.aurlqf t4t ~1nittb ~ta±t.s 
JnaGlrhtgton. ~. C!f. 20gi'!~ 
June 1, 1977 . 
RE: No. 76-539 Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman 
Dear Bi 11: 
As you know, for some time it•s been my view in school desegregation 
cases that we ought defer to dispositions concurred in by Districtcourts 
and Courts of Appeals. Theirs is a very difficult task that I have come 
to feel is deserving of the encouragement of our acceptance, unless they 
have very obviously gone wrong. Because that•s my approach, J•m disturb-
ed by the tone of your opinion. I think you are unnecessarily harsh, 
particularly on the Court of Appeals. Moreover, your reading of the 
opinions of both courts suggests that there was far less deliberate segre-
gation than I think those courts could find has been imposed or encouraged 
by the school board. I certainly think that the 11 cumulative violations 11 
constitute more than 11 Very little 11 support for the remedial order. Surely, 
at least they are cogent evidence of the school board•s deliberate discrim-
inatory intent, and in that circumstance, actions more subtle than blatant -
and perhaps even inaction - would buttress a finding of purposeful discrimi-
nation systemwide sufficient to support the remedical order. 
In short, 11 11 try my hand at writing separately, although 11 d rather 
not, and probably won•t if you can see your way to remove the chastizing 
tone. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 





June 1, 1977 
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No. 76-539 Dayton Board v. Brinkman 
Dear Bill: 
\' 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
lfp/ss 









.:§u:pumt <!Jtturt ttf t4t 'JE!ni:tdt .;§taus 
~as4ittghm, ~. <!J. 2llc?J!.2 
CHAM B E R S OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
June 1, 1977 





Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to Conference 
..-· 
., 
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1,.• 
.... - . 
.,."t .. ,, 
CHAMeERS OF 
.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
.Suprtmt Qfllud ltf t~t ~b ~hrlts 
'UJasJringtlln. ~. <!f. 2llpJ!~ 
June 1, 1977 
Re: No. 76-539 - Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman 
Dear Bill: 
Please show me as not participating in the consideration 
or decision of this case. 
Sincerely, 
T.M. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
.cc: The Conference 
CHAMBE RS OF 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
.;§upuutt <1J o-ttrl o-f tltt ~ttibb .§fili~ 
'Jllcu;frhtgto-tt, ]:9. QJ. zogm . .;l 
' ., 
' · I 
June 2, 1977 




If you would be willing to suggest language to 
carry out the suggestions contained in your note of 
June 1st, I would certainly give them careful considera-
tion. 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference •' 
~. 
I 
CHAMBE RS OF" 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
.§npr~nu Qj:omt cf Ur~ ~niub .§hrlig 
2J!frurlfittgtcn, lB. "f. 21TgtJ!..;l 
June 3, 1977 
Re: 76-539 - Dayton Board of Educ. v. Brinkman 
Dear Bill: 
On the whole, I think your opinion has handled 
a rather delicate situation extremely well. However, 
I did have a reaction somewhat comparable to Bill 
Brennan's because I am also rather sensitive to the 
problem of the District Judge on the firing line. If 
you make the changes, at least in substance, that he 
has proposed, I will join the opinion. 
I had one other sentence that troubled me that 
I would like to me ntion purely as a suggestion. It 
is the last sentence in the first full paragraph on 
page 12 beginning "In view of the confusion •••. " 
I tried my hand at a somewhat more moderate revision, 
and frankly could not improve upon the sentence. How-
ever, I wonder if we want to require additional evide 
to be taken in all events. Perhaps it would be wise 
to end by remand~rig ~to the District Court for the 
making of more specific findings and, if necessary, 
the taking of additional evidence." 
Respectfully, 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 






CHAMBERS OF" ·. 
~U:Vrtntt Q):trttrt ttf flt.t :!lfuittlt ~hrl.t$ 
JfagJtittgtott. ~. Qj:. 2ll.;t:l!' 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
June 3, 1977 
Re: 76-539 - Dayton Board of Educ. v. Brinkman 
Dear Bill: 
On the whole, I think your opinion has handled 
a rather delicate situation extremely well. However, 
I did have a reaction somewhat comparable to Bill 
Brennan's because I am also rather sensitive to the 
problem of the District Judge on the firing line. If 
you make the changes, at least in substance, that he 
has proposed, I will join the opinion. 
I had one other sentence that troubled me that 
I would like to mention purely as a suggestion. It 
is the last sentence in the first full paragraph on 
page 12 beginning "In view of the confusion ...• " 
I tried my hand at a somewhat more moderate revision, 
and frankly could not improve upon the sentence. How-
ever, I wonder if we want to require additional evidence 
to be taken in all events. Perhaps it would be wiser 
to end by re~and~rig ~to the District Court for the 
making of more specific findings and, if necessary, 
the taking of additional evidence." 
Respectfully, 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
































JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
.:§u:p-umt {Q:cttrl d fltt ~ttit.cb ~faieg 
'J)llr!Ullrmgttm. to. <q:. 2.a.?J.I.~ 
June 3, 1977 
Re: No. 76-539 - Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
jill j, 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
cc: The Conference 
I 
j;tqtrtutt <.!fl!ttrlltf tlrt ~tb- $5nrug, 
~agfringLm, ~. ~· 21lp't~ · . . ' ... "" 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
June 6, 1977 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: No. 76-539 Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman 
Herewith my response to the suggestions of Bill and 
John for changes in the presently circulating draft. I am 
most willing to accept two of your suggestions, Bill, but 
feel I cannot accept the remaining ones without somewhat 
altering the focus of the opinion. I can fully accept your 
suggestion, John, and will do so. I will recirculate to 
include the suggestions which I accept, unless I am advised 
by someone who has already joined that such inclusion would 
be objectionable. I do not regard my acceptance of any of 
the suggestions which I do accept as any sort of a quid pro 
quo in return for which either of you are committed to join 
the opinion. 
Your suggested wording changes on p. 7 and on p. 11, 
Bill, are entirely acceptable to me. I cannot, however, go 
along with the paragraph deletion on p. 11. I thought that 
one of the consensuses (if you will permit an anglicization 
of a Latin fifth declension noun) was that much of what is 
wrong in the present state of the case has been caused by the 
court of appeals' misperception of its proper role in the 
case, and the paragraph which you seek to delete attempts 
to address that problem. 
,/ 
/ 
. I am not presently inclined to incorporate your first 
suggested change on p. 13, Bill, not because I necessarily 
disagree with it, but because it seems to me to contain 
language which is not clarified or elsewhere addressed in 
the opinion. The final suggestion on pp. 13-14 I am not 
.. 
·' 
\ • 2 -
' . . . ' \'\... ' \ 
willing to incorporate, since it replaces -what ·seem·s -· to me 
to be a useful reference to the'relation of population 
distribution and "segregation" with another repetition of 
the more generalized "tailoring of the remedy to the violation" 
language which appears throughout the opinion. 
I agree fully with your proposed . revision of the last 







JUSTICE WM. J . BRENNAN, JR. 
~llpttlttt Qiltlttt llf f:4t ~b ;§taUs: 
JD'astrmgtan. :!fJ. <!f. 21lc?''-l.;l 
June 6, 1977 
RE: No. 76-539 Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman 
Dear Bi 11: 
I very much appreciate your consideration of my suggestions 
and fully understand why you'd prefer not to accept some of them. 
In the circumstances I'll shortly circulate an opinion concurring 
in the result. Needless to say nothing in your memorandum com-
mits you to incorporate any of my suggested changes. 
Sincerely, 
I ' 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
,jnp-rtmc <!Jllttli ttf t4t 'Jjtttitc~ ~htftg 
~l«fJ:rhtgfott.lO. <!J. ZO,?J!.$ 
June 6, 1977 




I agree with the suggestion John has made in the second 
paragraph of his letter of June 3 to you, and I hope it is possible 
for you to make that change. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS 01'" 
THE CHIEF" .JUSTICE 
.iltJlTttttt Q}~ud ltf tqt ~tti:ttb .Statts. 
Jfasfringhttt. ~. <q. 21lc?,.~ 
June 6, 1977 
I 
Re: 76-539 Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman 
Dear Bill: 
I join either way. 
Regards, 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
cc: The Conference 
C HA,.WERS OF 
.J U STICE WILLIAM H . REHNQU IST 
j;u.p-rtmt tqcurt cf t~~ 'Ji-tnittb j;tl:lUg 
2itas1ri:ttgtctt, gl. <.q. 2IT~J1~ 
J une 13, 1977 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: No. 76-539 Day-ton Board of Education v. Brinkman 
I have this morning sent to the printer an additional 
citation to be added on p. 13 of my opinion in this case. 
At the end of the full paragraph on the page (after "Hills, 
supra, at 294."), I am adding "See also Austin Independent 
School District Vu United States, U.So ____ , 






OARD OF EDUCATION v. 
BRINKMAN 
MR.JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
In my concurring opinion Keyes v. School District, 
___ U.S. ___ , ___ (1973), I urged abandonment of the de jure/ 
de facto distinction in desegregation as no longer ma 
meaningful years after legislated segregated schools had 
ceased to exist. Although the Court persists in this 
terminology, it is increasingly clear that the usage is 
largely an historical iiKHxiBR fiction. If a substantial 
degree of segregation is found to exist in a school district, 
this is viewed as sufficient to shift the burden of explanation 
Xk to the school board. It then becomes necessary forxk the 
Board to BXi explain its decisions over past years with 
respect to various aspects of school administration. E.&., 
assignment politics, attendance XBB zones, locations and 
closings of schools, adequacy and equality of facilities 
and instruction, faculty employment, and the like. 
Discriminatory intent by the school board is a 
prerequisite to finding a Fourteenth Amendment violation. 
But school boards rarely make a record of segregative 
intent. As I commented in Keyes, the Court simply inferred 
·. 
2. 
intent where substantial segregation persists and where 
the Board is not able satisfactorily to explain its action 
or nonaction that could have affected R - i.e. contributed 
to or perpetuated - the offending condition. In this respect 
desegregation cases differ substantially from many other 
claims of racial discrimination. Two recent decisions of 
this Court illustrate this distinction. In Washington v. 
Davis, ___ U.S. ___ (1976), the question was whether a 
particular test required of applicants for a police force 
violated the Fourteenth Amendment. This term, in 
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan , U.S. ___ (1977), 
the i alleged siaBximtaaEtxaiaBEimaRBXBX discriminatory 
state action was refusal to amend the Village's zoning code. 
Where specific or EBmaxxpaE comparatively isolated state 
action is involved - such as the employment of a particular 
test or the taking of some legislative action - intent 
usually can be established fromxk the surrounding facts 
and circumstances. Wheee , however , the conduct of an 
ongoing body - such as a school board - involving actions 
and BR nonactions extending over a period of years is 
under scrutiny , prima facie intent usually can be 
3. 
determinted only from de facto conduct. 
I write now, in this most summary form, merely to 
record my continued adherence to the views expressed at 
length in Keyes. I have come to think, however, that the 
distinction the courts continue to draw is of little 
practical distinction where the subject of inquiry sixiX 
is the conduct of itsasaiii affairs by a school board over 
a period of years. What it has done, or failed to do, 
may be sufficient to create a prima facie case wholly 
without& any regard to any proof of segregatory intent as 
the term was originally used. 
two 
In other respects, the/decisions handed down today - ~ 
in Milliken v. Bradley, post , at ___ , and in this case -
the Court has had occasion to clarify some of the ambiguities 
that many of our federal courts apparently perceived in 
In doing 
powers of an 
4. 
equity court are broad, remedies may not properly exceed 
the extent of the constitutional violations*. 
*Also , it is becoming more widely understood by the courts 
as well as the educators that the principal causes of the 
widespread school segregation found in the urban areas of 
this country are the demographic - the socio-economic -
iRBi influences which have tended to concentrate our 
minority citizens in the inner-city areas while the more 
mobile white majority disperses to the suburbs . As I 
made clear in Keles , attempts to impose a meausre of racial 
balance in schoo s throughout an urbanized area by massive 
transportation of children of all ages Bii often produces 
greater segregation in the end with negative educational 
consequences. Only slowly have we recognized the truth 
of what Professor Bickel wrote some years ago: 
(copy quote from Keyes) Bickel, The Supreme Court 
and the idea of progress , n . 7, at 132 . 
lfp/ss 6/18/77 
No. 76-539 DAYTON BOARD OF EDUCATION v • 
.KRXNKK BRINKMAN 
MRoJUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
In my concurring opinion Keyes v. School District, 
U.S. ____ , ____ (1973), I urged abandonment of the de jure/ 
de facto distinction in desegregation as no longer ma 
meaningful years after legislated segregated schools had 
ceased to exist. Although the Court persists in this 
terminology, it is increasingly clear that the usage is 
largely an historical f±ERXXEH fiction. If a substantial 
degree of segregation is found to exist in a school district, 
this is viewed as sufficient to shift the burden of explanation 
xk to the school board. It then becomes necessary forxk the 
Board to Rxi explain its decisions over past years with 
respect to various aspects of school administration. E.g., 
0 ~lo 0 ) d 1 ° d ass~gnment po ~t~s, atten ance xaR zones, ocat~ons an 
closings of schools, adequacy and equality of facilities 
and instruction, faculty employment, and the like. 
Discriminatory intent by the school board is a 
prerequisite to finding a Fourteenth Amendment violation. 
But school boards rarely make a record of segregative 
intent. As I commented in Keyes, the Court simply inferred 
2. 
intent where substantial segregation persists and where 
the Board is not able satisfactorily to explain its action 
or nonaction that could have affected ~ - i.eo contributed 
to or perpetuated - the offending condition. In this respect 
desegregation cases differ substantially from many other 
claims of racial discrimination. Two recent decisions of 
this Court illustrate this distinction. In Washington v. 
Davis, ____ U.S. ___ (1976), the question was whether a 
particular test required of applicants for a police force 
violated the Fourteenth Amendment. This term, in 
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan, u.s. (1977), 
the i alleged HXRKXXmXRRXXXHXRKXXmaRKKEX discriminatory 
state action was refusal to amend the Village's zoning code. 
Where specific or KEmRxxpax comparatively isolated state 
action is involved - such as the employment of a particular 
test or the taking of some legislative action - intent 
usually can be established fromXk the surrounding facts 
i and circumstances. Wheee, however, the conduct of an 
ongoing body - such as a school board - involving actions 
and ER nonactions extending over a period of years is 
under scrutiny, prima facie intent usually can be 
~ ~ ~ / ~~-:r::-:-~ _.. . ~· 
to)I.M,4~~ 
~~~~~~~~...A.~c4~ 
from de facto conduct. ~ ~~ .J 
/$_. ... c/~ac.-.t~ 
I write n w, in this most summary form, merely to ~ 
· ~ 
to the views expressed at ~ 
~ 
record my 
length in Keyes. I come to think, however, that the.~ 
distinction the courts 
~"-' 
to draw is of little 
"'-nc*'( 
the subject of inquiry sxxxx ~practical distinction 
is the conduct of ffairs by a school board over 
a period of years. What it as done, or failed to do, 
may be sufficient to create facie case wholly 
withouta ~ regard to any pro segregatory intent as 
the term was originally used. 
~ two 
In other respects, the/decisions handed down today -
" 
in Milliken v. Bradley, post, at _, and in this case -
the Court has had occasion to clarify some of the ambiguities 
that many of our federal courts appa¥~Qtly perceived in 
Swann v. Board of Education, 4o2 U.S. 1 (1971). In doing 
so, there has been no retreat from the basis commitment 
~4 •• ~:..-~~ 
kexxiaHa heralded in Brown I and II to •~•e~a8& ~o vestig~ 
- .J\ 
of state-imposed segregated education. Rather, the Swann 





equity court are broad, remedies may not properly exceed 
the extent of the constitutional violations*. 
*Also, it is becoming more widely understood by the courts 
as well as the educators that the principal causes of the 
widespread school segregation found in the urban areas of 
this country are the demographic - the socio-economic -
XHEX influences which have tended to concentrate our 
minority citizens in the inner-city areas while the more 
mobile white majority disperses to the suburbs. As I 
made clear in Keyes, attempts to impose a meausre of racial 
balance in schools throughout an urbanized area by massive 
transportation of children of all ages s£f often produces 
greater segregation in the end with negative educational 
consequences. Only slowly have we recognized the truth 
of what Professor Bickel wrote some years ago: 
(copy quote from Keyes) Bickel, The Supreme Court 
and the idea of progress, n. 7, at 132. 
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